

Message Text

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11

ACTION DLOS-04

INFO OCT-01 ARA-06 EA-07 IO-11 ISO-00 FEA-01 ACDA-07

AGR-05 AID-05 CEA-01 CEQ-01 CG-00 CIAE-00 CIEP-01

COME-00 DODE-00 DOTE-00 EB-07 EPA-01 ERDA-05 FMC-01

TRSE-00 H-02 INR-07 INT-05 JUSE-00 L-03 NSAE-00

NSC-05 NSF-01 OES-06 OMB-01 PA-01 PM-04 PRS-01 SP-02

SS-15 USIA-06 SAL-01 AF-06 EUR-12 NEA-10 /152 W

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R 021804Z APR 76

FM USMISSION USUN NEW YORK

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 6655

INFO AMEMBASSY JAKARTA

AMEMBASSY MANILA

AMEMBASSY NASSAU

C O N F I D E N T I A L USUN 1359

FROM LOS DEL

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PLOS

SUBJECT: LOS - ARCHIPELAGOS

1. SUMMARY: SITUATION REGARDING STRAITS AND ARCHIPELAGOS UNDERSTANDING WITH INDONESIA UNCERTAIN. CONVERSATION WITH MOCHTAR CIRCULAR. SOVIETS ATTEMPTING REDUCE SIZE OF BAHAMAS ARCHIPELAGO, PRESUMABLY AT CUBAN REQUEST. END.

2. IN COURSE COMMITTEE 2 DEBATE ON STRAITS, INDONESIA HAS REFRAINED FROM ENDORSING HARD-LINE STRAITS STATE AMENDMENTS, OR PROPOSING ITS OWN AMENDMENTS. INSTEAD, DJALAL HAS PUBLICLY SAID INDONESIA STILL NEEDS TO BE ASSURED THERE ARE ADEQUATE PROTECTIONS FOR STRAITS STATES, AND HAS RAISED UNHELPFUL QUESTIONS REGARDING OVERFLIGHT

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AND MEANING OF TEXT (E.G., WORDS "NORMAL MODE" AS THEY

APPLY TO SUBMARINES, AIRCRAFT CARRIERS, ETC.).

2. U.S. REPS OXMAN AND ADM. MORRIS (JCS) HAD LONG AND IN-CONCLUSIVE PRIVATE CONVERSATION WITH JUSTICE MINISTER MOCHTAR AND JUSUF (MFA). MOCHTAR WAS DEFENSIVE ABOUT DJALAL'S INTERVENTIONS, TRYING TO BLAME THEM ON HIS ENTHUSIASM; WE MADE CLEAR WE WERE RAISING QUESTIONS OF GOI POSITION, NOT REPEAT NOT COMPLAINING ABOUT DJALAL. HE REPEATEDLY REJECTED LINKAGE BETWEEN STRAITS AND ARCHIPELAGOS, BUT HIS DEFENSE OF GOI APPROACH ON STRAITS CAN BE CONSTRUED AS TACIT ACKNOWLEDGEMENT OF LINK. MOCHTAR THEN REGRETTED USG UNABLE TO CONSULT DURING INTERSESSIONAL PERIOD, AND JUSUF REFERRED TO PLANNED TRIP TO MOSCOW (LATER CANCELLED), LONDON AND WASHINGTON. WE SAID WE HAD NO KNOWLEDGE OF ANY SUCH SUGGESTION AND HAD LEFT GENEVA WITH TACIT UNDERSTANDING INDONESIA/U.S. BILATERALS WOULD BE FORTHCOMING DURING EARLY INTER-SESSIONAL PERIOD, BUT ONLY NEGATIVE RESPONSE FROM JAKARTA. MOCHTAR ACKNOWLEDGED THAT GOI HAD DELIBERATELY DECIDED TO DEFER BILATERALS AFTER GENEVA BUT HAD HOPED FOR THEM JUST BEFORE 1976 SESSION. HE ADDED THAT HE HAD NOT FOLLOWED THIS CAREFULLY AND HAD PRESUMED GOI HAD CONTACTED WASHINGTON.

4. REPEATED ATTEMPTS TO FOCUS ON WHERE WE GO FROM HERE WERE DEFLECTED BY MOCHTAR, DESPITE FACT THAT THERE IS CLEAR NEED TO HAVE IDEA WHAT WILL HAPPEN WHEN COMMITTEE REACHES ARCHIPELAGO CHAPTER. MOCHTAR SAID HIS GROUP IS WORKING ON AMENDMENTS, AND WHEN FINALLY PRESSED, SAID HE DID NOT PLAN TO AGREE ON GROUP AMENDMENTS UNACCEPTABLE TO U.S. HE WAS ENCOURAGED BY SOVIET ATTITUDES. MOCHTAR IDENTIFIED WIDTH OF CORRIDORS AS ONE OUTSTANDING ISSUE, AND PROPOSED 33 0/0 OR 20 MILES, WHICH-EVER IS LESS. WE SAID THERE WAS MORE WORK TO BE DONE, AND THAT SUCH NARROW CORRIDORS WERE NOT IN GOI INTERESTS AS THEY CREATED TEMPTATIONS. (BAHAMAS HAVE TOLD US SOVIETS SAID 30-50 MILE CORRIDORS WOULD BE SUFFICIENT). THEY SEEMED ANNOYED THAT INDONESIA WILL NOT LET THEM JOIN ARCHIPELAGO GROUP).

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5. MOCHTAR SUGGESTED WE TALK TO PHILIPPINES AND INVOKE OUR TRADITIONAL RELATIONSHIPS. WE SAID WE HOPED PHILIPPINES COULD GO ALONG WITH PACKAGE, WOULD CONSIDER HIS SUGGESTION, AND THAT IT WAS A CONCESSION FROM US TO BE WILLING TO SUPPORT ARCHIPELAGO STATUS DESPITE THEIR POSSIBLE PHILIPPINE OPPOSITION TO PACKAGE, INCLUDING UNIMPEDED PASSAGE OF STRAITS.

6. MOCHTAR REPEATED OLD THEMES OF BILATERAL AGREEMENT AND NO TREATY, CITING U.S. 200-MILE FISHING ZONE AS EVIDENCE OF GROWING ACCEPTANCE OF UNILATERAL CLAIMS. WE POINTED OUT THAT IT MIGHT BE MORE DIFFICULT FOR INDONESIA TO JUSTIFY ARCHIPELAGO CLAIM ONCE PRINCIPLE OF 200-MILE ECONOMIC ZONE IS WIDELY ACCEPTED, AND THEREFORE IT WAS IN OUR MUTUAL INTERESTS TO WRAP UP ISSUE IN LOS TREATY. WE STRESSED THAT U.S. APPROACH ON ARCHIPELAGOS LINKED TO INDONESIAN POSITION ON PACKAGE. MOCHTAR SAID WE ATTACHED TOO MUCH WEIGHT ON INDONESIA.

7. MOCHTAR WENT INTO LONG DISCUSSION OF INABILITY OF PEOPLE FROM JAVA TO SAY NO, LEADING TO MISUNDERSTANDING, SUCH AS HAPPENED IN ASEAN ON PHILIPPINES TRADE PROPOSAL. CLEAR IMPLICATION WAS THAT WE WERE MISINTERPRETING SUDHARMONO'S ACTIONS. HE RAISED OLD QUESTION THAT U.S. MUST ENDORSE ARCHIPELAGO FIRST. WE SAID WE WERE FULLY PREPARED TO ENDORSE INCLUSION OF ARCHIPELAGO IN LOS TREATY, ONCE AGREEMENT REACHED ON DEFINITION AND NAVIGATION PACKAGE, AND HINTED THAT WE COULD DO SO AT VERY HIGH LEVEL NEXT WEEK. MOCHTAR DID NOT RESPOND. WE ALSO NOTED INCLUSION OF ARCHIPELAGOS AS ONE OF 10 MAIN POINTS IN STEVENSON-OXMAN ARTICLE DISTRIBUTED TO ALL CAPITALS AS PERSONAL GESTURE OF GOOD FAITH.

8. AFTER CONSIDERABLE EFFORT TO FIND OUT WHERE WE SHOULD GO FROM HERE, MOCHTAR SUGGESTED TECHNICAL TALKS WITH GOI AND THAT WE MAINTAIN CONTACT THROUGH FIJI.

9. MEETINGS WITH BAHAMAS FONMIN ADDERLY HAVE BEEN EXCELLENT. BAHAMAS IS STRONGLY SUPPORTING US ON STRAITS. ADDERLY SAID THAT THEY TOLD SOVIETS THAT EFFORTS TO PRECLUDE LINES BEING DRAWN TO DRYING ROCKS AND REEFS
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WOULD NOT REPEAT NOT OFFSET BAHAMIAN LINES IN THE SOUTH, BUT ONLY IN THE NORTH, AND THAT THEY SHOULD TELL THIS TO THEIR CUBAN FRIENDS. WHEN SOVIETS BROACHED SAME ISSUE WITH US, WE SAID IT WOULD PROBABLY HURT FIJI AND BAHAMAS, AND THIS WAS POOR TACTICS, SINCE THESE STATES WERE STRONGLY SUPPORTING U.S. - SOVIET VIEWS ON NAVIGATION. WE DID NOT REPEAT NOT ALLUDE TO CUBA.

10. COMMENTS: MEETING WITH MOCHTAR WAS NOT EASY. WE ARE UNCLEAR WHERE HE REALLY STANDS, BUT DETECT AN UNWILLINGNESS TO DEAL WITH US (EXCEPT PERHAPS TACITLY) AT LEAST AT THIS TIME.
SCRANTON

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